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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
HOLLILUNDAHL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
Case No. 20020240-CA

RAY HARDING, JR., et al.,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 2002). On July 15,2002, it
was transferred to this Court by the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-2
2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Entry of a judgment, even by default, is never a ministerial matter. Plaintiff
failed to state a claim for relief against the defendants for Judge Harding's decision not to
grant her default judgments.
This issue was not raised in the trial court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: While this issue was not raised in the trial court,
this Court can affirm the decision of the trial court on this related, alternative, ground.
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Buehner Block Company v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988); State
v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 355 n.3 (Utah 1996).
2. Plaintiffs claims against the defendants are an attempt to collaterally attack the
decisions of Judge Harding in a prior action and are therefore impermissible.
This issue was not raised in the trial court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: While this issue was not raised in the trial court,
this Court can affirm the decision of the trial court on this related, alternative, ground.
Buehner Block Company v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988); State
v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 355 n.3 (Utah 1996).
3. In her first amended complaint, plaintiff sought to add new claims and causes of
action that were not set out in either her original notice of claim or her original complaint.
The trial court correctly dismissed these claims for lack of jurisdiction.
This issue was raised by the defendants' motion to dismiss. R. 472-76.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the
defendant's motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only a question of law, the Court
gives the trial courts' ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness standard.
Zion's First National Bank v. Fox & Co.. 942 P.2d 324, 326 (Utah 1997).
4. The defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
This issue was raised by the defendants' motion to dismiss. R. 470-72.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the
defendant's motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only a question of law, the Court

gives the trial courts' ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness standard.
Zion's First National Bank. 942 P.2d at 326.
5. Plaintiffs claims against Judge Harding are barred by res judicata.
This issue was raised by the defendants' motion to dismiss. R. 468-70.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the
defendant's motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only a question of law, the Court
gives the trial courts' ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness standard.
Zion's First National Bank. 942 P.2d at 326.
6. Plaintiffs claims against Deputy Clerk Tronier are barred by collateral
estoppel.
This issue was not raised in the trial court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: While this issue was not raised in the trial court,
this Court can affirm the decision of the trial court on this related, alternative, ground.
Buehner Block Company v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988); State
v. South. 924 P.2d 354,355 n.3 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 Claim against state or its employee - Time for
filing notice. (Supp 2002)
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment,
or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or before the expiration of
any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
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Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Default
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules
and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment
for the amount claimed and costs against the defendant if:
(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear;
(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person;
(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and
(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can
be made certain by computation.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or
to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the
court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems
necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may
likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule
apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a
third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or
counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations
of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by
default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by
evidence satisfactory to the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Holli Lundahl brought this action on April 13,2001 against Judge Ray Harding, Jr.
R. 1-199. On July 31,2001, Judge Harding filed a motion to dismiss. R. 208-49. This
motion was based on judicial immunity and res judicata (relying upon the dismissal of a
prior action brought by the plaintiff against this defendant). R. 242-45. Rather than
4

respond to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff filed afirstamended complaint on October
5,2001. 258-430.
In her first amended complaint, the plaintiff added a second defendant, Deputy
Clerk Mike Tronier. R. 428-30. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first
amended complaint on October 26,2001. R. 431-484. The trial court granted the motion
to dismiss on December 10,2001. R. 580-82. Plaintiff filed a Rule 59 motion to correct
the judgment on December 27, 2001. R. 585-93. The trial court denied this motion on
February 20,2002 (entered on February 22, 2002), and signed the formal judgment
dismissing this action as to both defendants on the same date (also entered on February
22,2002). R. 594-97. On March 19,2002, the plaintiff filed her notice of appeal. R.
611.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In their motion to dismiss the first amended complaint, the defendants did not
challenge the factual claims made in that document.
On June 4,1999, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against nineteen defendants, including
Empire of American Realty Credit Corporation (Empire), Source One Mortgage Services
Corporation (Source One), and CNA Insurance Company (CNA) alleging tortious
interference claims. R. 428 (case no. 990402021 - Fourth District Court). Lundahl
obtained default certificates against Empire, Source One, and CNA from defendant
Tronier in that action. R. 426. Judge Harding then held a hearing on September 23,1999
on Lundahl's request for default judgments. At the hearing, Judge Harding set aside the
5

defaults against CNA and Empire. Subsequently, on October 12, 1999, Judge Harding set
aside the default against Source One. R. 422-25.
Judge Harding granted a motion to dismiss case no. 990402021 as to CNA on
January 25, 2000. R. 419-22. On March 7, 2000, Judge Harding ruled that Source One
had been improperly served. R. 419.
On April 12,2000, Lundahl brought an action against Judge Harding claiming that
he had violated her civil rights by setting aside the default judgments against CNA,
Empire and Source One in the prior litigation. R. 453-64 (case no. 000401252). On
November 15, 2000, Judge Trevort issued an order dismissing that action with prejudice
on the basis of judicial immunity. R. 441. On appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of
the plaintiffs claims against Judge Harding. R. 437-38, a copy is attached to this brief as
Addendum A.
On April 24, 2000, plaintiff filed a notice of claim against the defendants. R. 43135. But in her first amended complaint, the plaintiff added allegations against the
defendants relating to alleged conduct involving a separate lawsuit pending before Judge
Howard of the Fourth District Court. R. 406-7, 418. These allegations were not
contained in her original notice of claim. In opposing the dismissal of her first amended
complaint (which was filed on October 5, 2001), the plaintiff submitted a second notice of
claim dated August 8,2001 which did contain notice of these new claims, but was served
well after the filing of the present lawsuit. R. 526-35.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Holli Lundahl claims that Judge Harding and his clerk, Mike Tronier, should have
granted her default judgments against certain defendants in a prior lawsuit. The entry of a
default judgment is not a ministerial act. Judgment, even by default, can only be entered
when the well-pled facts of the complaint state a valid legal basis for granting judgment
to the plaintiff. Plaintiff cannot state a valid claim against the judge, or his clerk, for
judicially denying her a default judgment in a prior action.
Plaintiffs claims are also fatally defective in that she seeks to collaterally attack
judicial decisions in a prior action that have not been overturned or brought into question
in any manner.
The trial court was without jurisdiction over plaintiffs other claims, raised for the
first time in her amended complaint, because they were not presented in her timely filed
notice of claim. A second notice of claim, only filed after this lawsuit was commenced
and less than 90 days before the filing of the first amended complaint, did not correct the
jurisdictional defect.
Both defendants are entitled to judicial immunity. Plaintiffs claims against Judge
Harding are also barred by res judicata based on the dismissal of her prior suit against the
judge. Plaintiffs claims against Mike Tronier are also barred by collateral estoppel based
on the dismissal of the same prior action.

7

ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS
Throughout her first amended complaint and her opening brief, plaintiff treats the
entry of a default judgment as if it were a ministerial act that she was entitled to have the
defendants perform. This misstates Utah law.
Judgments by default are not favored by the courts nor are they in
the interest of justice and fair play. No one has an inalienable or
constitutional right to a judgment by default without a hearing on the
merits. The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where
possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of
every case.
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin. 14 Utah 2d 60, 62, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (1962) (footnote
omitted).
Default judgments are not ministerial in nature, but are judicial decisions similar to
any other judicial decision. Under Utah law it is not enough that a defendant has failed to
appear. The plaintiffs claims must still be adequate to entitle her to judgment, a
discretionary decision that must be made by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer.
We do not agree that Smith's failure to appear entitled Pennington to
a default judgment. Under rule 55, a defendant's failure to appear warrants
an entry of default but does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to a default
judgment. Even though a defendant fails to appear, a plaintiff is entitled to
default judgment "only if the well-pled facts show that the plaintiff is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Likewise, "[t]he uncontroverted
allegations of the complaint must be sufficient on their face to establish a
valid claim against the defaulting party."

8

Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 973 P.2d 932,940 (Utah 1998) (citation and footnote
omitted); see also Skanchv v. Calcados Ortope SA. 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998)
(even if a defendant defaults, "a court may grant relief only if a valid legal basis
supported by well-pled facts is asserted in the complaint.").
Because the decision of whether or not a default judgment should be granted is a
discretionary judicial one, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the defendants.
Deputy Clerk Tronier provided the plaintiff with default certificates. Whether or not the
plaintiff was entitled to actual default judgments in a prior proceeding entails a
discretionary judicial determination that cannot be the grounds for a separate lawsuit
against the judge and his clerk who made these decisions. The trial court's dismissal of
this action should be affirmed because the plaintiff failed to state a claim against the
defendants.
II. LUNDAHL CANNOT COLLATERALLY ATTACK DECISIONS
MADE IN PRIOR LAWSUITS
The entirety of Lundahl's action against the defendants is an effort to relitigate
issues and decisions from prior lawsuits because she does not agree with the results
achieved in the previous proceedings. If the plaintiff can bring an action against a judge
for a decision that is still valid andfinal,a unique opportunity is created for inconsistent
decisions. To succeed in this action, Lundahl would have to convince the court that
Judge Harding's prior decisions were erroneous. And yet the trial court would then be
placed in the quandary of providing monetary or equitable relief against the defendant
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judge, but without having authority to alter the decisions that are alleged to be erroneous.
"[T]he judge of one division of the same court cannot sit as an appellate court and
overrule another judge." Johnson v. Johnson, 560 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Utah 1977). Even if
the order in question is interlocutory in nature, a fellow judge cannot set it aside.
Harward v. Harward. 526 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Utah 1974); State v. Morgan, 527 P.2d 225,
226 (Utah 1974) ("District Judge cannot overrule another acting District Judge having
identical authority and stature."). In Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT
77, 52 P.2d 1267, the court ruled that a plaintiff who failed to appeal or otherwise attack a
trial court's decision could not normally collaterally attack that decision in a new action.
In Heck v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court
adopted such a rule for challenges to criminal proceedings (including writs of habeas
corpus) brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that
has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-87 (emphasis in original).
Defendants urge this Court to hold that a plaintiff can not state a cause of action
when the judicial decisions she challenges have not been reversed or otherwise
invalidated or brought into question. To do otherwise would permit actions, such as the
10

current one, in which a litigious party can continually seek to relitigate the same issues.
Lundahl previously sued Judge Harding, seeking to collaterally attack his decisions in her
prior lawsuit. R. 453-64. Having lost that matter in the trial court, and on appeal (R. 43741), she then filed this action (adding Judge Harding's clerk as a new defendant) in a
further attempt to challenge Judge Harding's judicial decisions that she disagrees with.
These lawsuits have been commenced even though the challenged decisions have
not been reversed, overruled or otherwise brought into question. The very same reasons
that led the United States Supreme Court to not permit the use of § 1983 actions as a
method of collateral attack to a valid criminal conviction suggest that Utah should not
permit such ongoing collateral attacks against a trial court's decisions. If such decisions
are in error, they can be challenged on appeal or by extraordinary writ. Defendants ask
this Court to affirm the dismissal of this action on the grounds that plaintiff cannot state a
claim against a judge, or his clerk, for alleged errors injudicial decisions when those
decisions have not been overturned or otherwise brought into question.
III. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE A NOTICE OF
CLAIM CONCERNING HER ALLEGATIONS OF INTERFERENCE
WITH AN ACTION BEFORE JUDGE HOWARD DEPRIVED THE
COURTS OF JURISDICTION OVER THIS CLAIM
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act governs the procedure for suing the State
of Utah, its agencies, and its employees. Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court
have held that the filing of the notices of claim required by the Act is a jurisdictional
precondition to filing any suit against the state or its employees. Lamarr v. Utah State
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Dep'tofTransp.. 828 P.2d 535, 540-42 (Utah App. 1992); Rushton v. Salt Lake
County. 1999 UT 36, ^18, 977 P.2d 1201; Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 249-50
(Utah 1988). Full (strict) compliance with the requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder. Lamarr. 828 P.2d at
540-42; Rushton. 1999 UT 36,1J19; Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d
480,482 (Utah 1975).
At the relevant time, the Governmental Immunity Act required that:
[a] claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope
of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim
is filed with the attorney general within one year after the claim arises . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 2002) (in part). The Utah Supreme Court has held
that the requirement of filing a notice of claim is very broad and applies comprehensively
to many types of actions.
The Immunity Act defines injury as "death, injury to a person, damage to or
loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person,
or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his
agent." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5). The language "any other injury that
a person may suffer," in addition to the generalized enumerated categories
listed in the definition indicates an intent to draw a broad net over the
multitudinous harms that plaintiffs might allege against government
officials.
Thomas v. Lewis. 2001 UT 49, T[19, 26 P.3d 217 (court without jurisdiction to consider
statutory forfeiture claim due to plaintiffs failure to file a notice of claim).
While the plaintiff filed a notice of claim before commencing this action, it only
gave notice that she would bring an action concerning claims that she was wrongfully
12

denied default judgments in a prior proceeding before Judge Harding. R. 431-35. No
mention was made of any claim concerning attempts by the defendants to improperly
interfere with a completely different lawsuit being heard by Judge Howard. These claims
were made for the first time in the first amended complaint. R. 413-18. Defendants
moved to dismiss these claims due to the plaintiffs failure to raise them in her notice of
claim.
The courts are without jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs new claims because they
are beyond the scope of the notice of claim that was filed. The notice did not articulate
any intent to bring such claims. Because they are beyond the scope of the notice of claim
that was filed, the trial court correctly dismissed these claims for lack of jurisdiction.
Stralev v. Hallidav. 2000 UT App 38,ffl[12-17, 997 P.2d 338 (failure of timely filed
notice of claim to include claim that individual acted with fraud or malice was a
jurisdictional defect for which the suit was properly dismissed: "A proper notice of claim
must be filed to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction."); Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127,
1129 (Utah 1990) (suit is barred on any cause of action not within the scope of the notice
of claim filed); White v. Heber City. 82 Utah 547, 26 P.2d 333, 335 (1933) (causes of
action for damages not raised in first, timely, notice of claim were not properly before the
court); Sweet v. Salt Lake City. 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167, 1172 (1913) ("What we do
hold, however, is that where the claimant seeks to recover for a different item or element
of damages, as in this case, he cannot do so for the reason that such item or element is not
described or referred to in the original claim presented to the city council").
13

Regardless of whether the defendants may be entitled to immunity, the plaintiff
was still required to provide notice of his intent to bring such a suit. In Hall v. Utah State
Department of Corrections. 2001 UT 34, 24 P.3d 419, the court expressly held that the
substantive immunity of the state did not protect it from lawsuits under the Whistleblower
Act. Id. at Tf 18. But even though substantive immunity did not apply, the court upheld
the dismissal of the action on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the
procedural requirement that he file a notice of claim before filing his action. Id at ^[2127. In reaching this decision, the court stressed the very real and important purposes that
the notice of claim requirement fulfilled. Id at ^[22-23 (prevent payment of spurious
claims, permit government ample opportunity to examine into both the cause and extent
of the injury).
This Court reached the same conclusion in rejecting a plaintiffs argument that he
was not required to file a notice of claim because there was no substantive sovereign
immunity applicable to his cause of action.
However, Nielson confuses the scope of the notice requirement with the
extent of substantive sovereign immunity protection. Complying with the
notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act is a jurisdictional
requirement and a precondition to suit, and is in no way co-extensive with
the substantive provisions contained within the Governmental Immunity
Act which insulate the sovereign and its operatives from liability.
Nielson v. Gurlev. 888 P.2d 130, 135 (Utah App. 1995) (emphasis in original).
Lundahl seeks to avoid the consequences of her failure to raise these new issues in
her timely notice of claim by relying on a second notice of claim dated August 8, 2001,
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well after this action was filed and less than 90 days before the first amended complaint
was filed. R. 526-35. But in HaH, the court made it clear that "[o]nly after the state has
had the opportunity to consider the claim for ninety days is suit against the government
allowed/' IdL at ^22. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court, in Hall determined that the filing
of the notice of claim on the same day that the complaint was filed was a fatal
jurisdictional defect that required the dismissal of the action. Id. at ^[26 (action can only
be filed after claims have been denied by government).
Lundahl's reliance on her August 8, 2001 notice of claim is erroneous. This
second notice of claim was filed over four months after this action was commenced. The
defendants and the State of Utah never had an opportunity to consider these new claims
before the action was filed. Nor can the existence of the first amended complaint make
these claims timely. The first amended complaint was filed on October 5, 2001, less than
90 days after the date of the second notice of claim. Plaintiff failed to show that this
second notice of claim was ever denied. Therefore, even if the filing of an amended
complaint could undo the jurisdictional failure to timely file a notice of claim before
commencing an action, the timing of the second notice of claim is still defective. The
first amended complaint was filed before the second notice of claim was statutorily
denied at the end of 90 days. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14 (1997). For these reasons the
trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs new claims should be affirmed.
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IV. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST JUDGE
HARDING, AND DEPUTY CLERK TRONIER ARE
BARRED BY ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Plaintiffs claims against the defendants are based on Judge Harding's denial of
Lundahl's sought for default judgments in a prior court action. Mike Tronier issued the
default certificates that the plaintiff sought (R. 426), but Judge Harding ruled that she was
not entitled to judgments against certain parties based upon their alleged defaults. R.41926. The only challenged conduct was performed by Judge Harding in his judicial
capacity, i.e., considering motions made to the court and rendering decisions on matters
before that court. The first amended complaint alleges no actions by the defendants other
than that they made decisions that were contrary to the wants and desires of the plaintiff.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that judicial immunity is
essential to the orderly functioning of our judicial system. Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547,
554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217 (1967).
In Stump v. Sparkman. 435 U.S. 349, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978), a § 1983 action was
brought against a state court judge who approved a petition for sterilization without a
proper hearing or notice, contrary to state law. The Court noted that, because some of the
most difficult questions with which a judge must deal pertain to jurisdiction, "the scope of
the judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the
judge." Stump, 98 S. Ct. at 1105. The Court held that a judge could be deprived of this
immunity only if he/she acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." The Court found
the judge in question to be immune from suit because he was performing a judicial act.
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Although he proceeded informally, (1) he was performing a function normally performed
by a judge, and, (2) he had dealt with the parties in his judicial capacity. Stump, 98 S.Ct.
at 1106-1108. The state court judge was therefore absolutely immune from suit, even if
the actions taken by him were in error.
In Mireles v. Waco. 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991), the Court reaffirmed its prior holdings
and reiterated that: "Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on
occasion, 'it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration
of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to
act upon his convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.'"
Id. at 287 (citations and footnote omitted).
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also recognized that judges enjoy absolute
immunity for judicial functions so that courts may function without harassment or
intimidation. Christensen v. Ward. 916 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990); VanSickle v.
Hollowav. 791 F.2d 1431, 1434-35 (10th Cir. 1986).
In the present case Judge Harding was acting in his capacity as a Fourth District
Court Judge of the State of Utah at all times and in all of the activities that plaintiff claims
violated her constitutional rights. Judge Harding was within his jurisdiction, performing
functions normally performed by judges, and dealing with the parties in his official
capacity as a Utah District Court Judge. Certainly Judge Harding was not acting in the
"clear absence of all jurisdiction" when he reached the challenged decisions.
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Defendant Mike Tronier, as a court clerk, is entitled to that same judicial
immunity. This defendant, as an agent and servant of the State of Utah's Fourth District
Court, is entitled to absolute judicial immunity because his actions were integral parts of
the judicial process. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983). Utah has long
followed this rule. Absolute judicial immunity will be provided to all individuals who
perform integral parts of the judicial process where such immunity is needed to "protect
functions intimately related and essential to the judicial decision-making process." Parker
v. Dodgion. 971 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1998) (court-appointed psychologist entitled to
absolute judicial immunity); Black v. Clegg. 938 P.2d 293, 297 (Utah 1997) ("Thus,
Clegg as Bar president and Baldwin as Bar executive acting as clerk of the disciplinary
court are immune from suit."); Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1993)
(quasi-judicial immunity extended to all participants in attorney disciplinary proceeding).
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "[c]ourt clerks, like judges, are
entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights actions for damages when performing
tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process. This protection from suit has also
been extended to administrative officials who perform duties that are functionally
equivalent to those of a court clerk." Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of E d u c 858 P.2d 1372,
1380 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). In Ambus, the court held that an administrative
officer was entitled to absolute immunity for determining at what address to send the
plaintiff notice of a scheduled hearing. Id at 1381.
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In Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812 (10th Cir.
1981), the Court held that court clerks or other judicial servants and agents could not be
sued because of their part in the court's discharge of its judicial functions.
Furthermore, we fully agree with this language contained in
Blouin v. Dembitz, 367 F.Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd.
489 F.2d 488 (2nd Cir. 1973):
Statutes and ruling case law protecting state judges in the
discharge of their functions may not be circumvented or
vitiated, by pretending to maintain this suit also against their
"clerks, servants and agents11 for no court can discharge its
judicial duties without the aid of clerks, servants and agents.
Wiggins, 664 F.2d at 815. The plaintiffs claims against Mike Tronier all relate to the
fact that he was Judge Harding's clerk. No action of his, other than his employment by
that court is alleged as being improper.1 There is no allegation that he did anything more
than act as the servant and agent of his court in this action. His actions were integral parts
of the judicial process and the trial court was correct in dismissing this action based on his
being entitled to absolute immunity.
V. LUNDAHL'S CLAIMS AGAINST JUDGE
HARDING ARE BARRED BY RES JUDICATA
Lundahl has previously sued Judge Harding, claiming that his decisions in a prior
lawsuit were wrong. R. 453-64. The factual allegations in that prior action are the same
as those presented in the present matter. That action was dismissed and the dismissal was

1

Tronier is alleged to have provided the default certificates requested by the
plaintiff, but is somehow to be held liable for Judge Harding's decisions that denied
Lundahl the default judgments she desired. The only other allegations against Tronier
relate to the claims over which the trial court had no jurisdiction.
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affirmed on appeal. R. 437-41. The plaintiffs attempt to sue Judge Harding a second
time is barred by res judicata.
A long line of Utah court decisions has held that the doctrine of res judicata bars a
party from seeking to relitigate not only matters litigated in a previous lawsuit, but any
matter that could have been litigated between the parties in the prior action. Peterson v.
Peterson, 645 P.2d 37 (Utah 1982); Bradshaw v. Kershaw. 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981);
International Resources v. Dunfield. 599 P.2d 575 (Utah 1979).
In In Re General Determination of Rights to the Use of all Water, Murdock v.
Springville Municipal Corp.. 1999 UT 39 fl6, 982 P.2d 65, the court explained that for
res judicata (or claim preclusion):
to apply, a party must prove the following: (i) both cases must involve the
same parties, their privies or assigns; (ii) the claim sought to be barred
either must have been presented or have been available to be presented in
the first case; and (iii) the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment
on the merits.
The plaintiff (Holli Lundahl) and the defendant (Judge Harding) are the same in both
actions. Lundahl either did, or could have, presented all claims against Judge Harding in
her previous action. The first action was dismissed, which dismissal was affirmed by this
Court on appeal. All three elements of res judicata/claim preclusion have been met. Res
judicata barred the plaintiffs efforts to once again litigate these issues that she lost in her
prior lawsuit and the trial court's dismissal of this action should be affirmed on appeal.
In an effort to avoid the bar of res judicata, plaintiff claims that she could not have
brought her state law claims in her prior action because she had not yet received a denial
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of her notice of claim. Nothing prevented the plaintiff from waiting the requisite time to
permit her notice of claim to be denied. To do so would not have made her civil rights
claims in the first action untimely. Her voluntary conduct in prematurely filing her prior
action does not prevent its dismissal from barring this lawsuit concerning the same factual
issues. To do otherwise would be to permit the plaintiff, by her own actions, to create
piecemeal litigation contrary to Utah's public policy. "Having failed to raise the issue in
the initial proceeding, Nebeker waived any opportunity to bring it later either before the
district court or in another forum. This decision is supported by sound policy
considerations. To begin, to hold otherwise would create procedural confusion and
piecemeal litigation, as demonstrated by this very case." Nebeker v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n. 2001 UT 74,1ffll8-l9, 34 P.3d 180.
Just as a plaintiff must file a notice of claim and have it denied before she can file
an action under Utah law, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination and receive a
"right to sue" letter before filing a Title VII action. The federal courts have rejected the
plaintiffs claim in the Title VII context. Where a plaintiff has filed a Title VII claim,
after having other claims dismissed on the merits, the courts have applied res judicata and
refused the argument that the Title VII claims could not have been joined in the prior
actions because the plaintiffs were still awaiting the prerequisite "right to sue" letter.
Havercombe v. Dep't of Educ. 250 F.3d 1, 8 (1 st Cir. 2001) (lack of "right to sue" letter
for later in time Title VII claims did not prevent them from being barred by plaintiffs
failure to raise them in prior action); Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan. 244 F.3d 708,
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714-15 (9th Cir. 2001) (Title VII claims not exempt from res judicata even though
plaintiffs claimed they were barred from joining such claims in the prior action because
they had not received a "right to sue" letter); Jang v. United Tech. Corp.. 206 F.3d 1147,
1149 (11th Cir. 2000) (ADA claims were subject to bar of res judicata even though
plaintiff had sought, but not received, a "right to sue" letter before filing the prior action);
Churchill v. Star Enter.. 183 F.3d 184, 191-92 (3rd Cir. 1999) (all claims that required
"right to sue" letter were barred from being litigated in second action even though no
letter was obtained during first litigation); Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of E d u c 143 F.3d
1029, 1032-33 (6th Cir. 1998) (permitting two suits - one under Title VII after the demise
of the prior litigation containing the remainder of the plaintiffs claims - would be both
inefficient and unduly burdensome); Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp.. 972 F.2d 36, 39-41
(2nd Cir. 1992) (Title VII claim barred even though no "right to sue" letter received before
the statute of limitations would have run on other claims).
Plaintiff could have waited and filed one action including all of her claims.
Instead, she brought the prior action that was dismissed on the merits. She cannot now
bring a second action against the same defendant and avoid the bar of res judicata by
claiming that her state law claims had yet to be denied at the time she filed her prior
action. Instead, Lundahl failed to even file a notice of claim until after she had filed her
prior action against Judge Harding. R. 431-35,453-64. The trial court correctly
dismissed this action on the basis of res judicata and that decision should be affirmed on
appeal.
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VI. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST MIKE TRONIER ARE
BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The plaintiffs claims against defendant Tronier, other than the new claims
addressed above, relate back to the subject of the prior lawsuit against Judge Harding that
was dismissed on the basis ofjudicial immunity. The prior action was dismissed on the
merits. All of the claims addressed in the prior litigation are barred by collateral estoppel,
or issue preclusion.
The four elements of issue preclusion are: (i) the party against whom issue
preclusion is asserted must have been a party to or in privity with a party to
the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must
be identical to the one presented in the instant action; (iii) the issue in the
first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv)
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
In Re General Determination of Rights to the Use of all Water. Murdock v. Springville
Municipal Corp.. 1999 UT 39 f 18, 982 P.2d 65. There can be no argument but that the
first element has been met. The same Holli Lundahl who is the plaintiff in this matter
was the plaintiff before Judge Tervort in the Fourth District Court in Case No.
000401252. R. 453-64.
The second element, that the issues be identical, is also met. It is not necessary
that the legal question be the same in both actions, only that the factual issues be the
same. Robertson v. Campbell. 674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983): see also Berry v. Berry.
738 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah App. 1987); Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d
387, 390 (Utah App. 1987). As stated above, the same reasoning that provided Judge
Harding with absolute judicial immunity from the plaintiffs claims, indicates that the
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judge's clerk would be entitled to the same immunity for his conduct in working with his
judge.
The third element, full and fair litigation, requires only that flfthe parties must
receive notice, reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise them of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.1"
Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corrections. 942 P.2d 933, 939 (Utah 1997).
The plaintiff was heard and permitted to argue against the dismissal of her previous
action. R. 441. She clearly had notice of the action and had an opportunity to present her
objections to its dismissal.
Finally, the prior action ended with a final judgment being entered against
Lundahl. That judgment was affirmed on appeal by this Court. R. 437-41.
Because all four elements of collateral estoppel have been met, the plaintiffs
action against Deputy Clerk Mike Tronier was barred thereby and properly dismissed.
Plaintiff was not free to refile her action, but is bound by collateral estoppel.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, defendants Judge Ray Harding, Jr. and Deputy Clerk
Mike Tronier ask this Court to affirm the dismissal of this action.
DEFENDANTS DO NOT DESIRE ORAL ARGUMENT
OR A PUBLISHED OPINION
Judge Harding and Deputy Clerk Tronier do not request oral argument and a
published opinion in this matter. The questions raised in this appeal, having already been
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decided by this Court in published opinions, are not such that oral argument or a
published opinion are necessary, though the defendants desire to participate in oral
argument if such is held by the Court.
Respectfully submitted this ^-

day of January, 2003.

^J ^
BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of
Defendants-Appellees, postage prepaid, to the following on this the
November, 2O0£:
Holli Lundahl
200 E. Center Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Plaintiff Pro Se
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Holli Lundahl,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Honorable Ray Harding, Jr.,
Defendant and Appellee.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20010049-CA
FILED
May 3, 2001
ll 2001 UTApp142 |l

Fourth District, Provo Department
The Honorable Louis G. Tervort
Attorneys:
Holli Lundahl, Midvale, Appellant Pro Se
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme.
PER CURIAM:
Lundahl appeals the trial court's November 15, 2000 order granting Judge Harding's motion to dismiss and
denying her motion for summary judgment as well as the December 27, 2000 order denying her motion for new
judgment. We affirm.
Lundahl seeks to hold Judge Harding liable for decisions he made in case number 990402021, Fourth District
Court. However, a trial judge acting within the scope of his authority is not liable for or subject to suit for his
decisions. Se_e Christensen v. Ward. 916 F.2d 1462,1473 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[Jjudges are absolutely immune from
suit on any claim based in the conduct of their office, including allegations that a decision is erroneous, malicious,
or in excess of their judicial authority."). Judge Harding was acting in his judicial capacity over a case within his
jurisdiction and thus, is immune from suit. Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999), upon which Lundahl relies, only
allows prospective injunctive relief against a judge when he has violated a declaratory decree or when no other
declaratory relief is available. Lundahl seeks retroactive relief, has not shown that Judge Harding violated a
declaratory decree, and has other remedies, namely, filing a direct appeal if she is dissatisfied with the final
judgment in federal court.
Affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

